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ABSTRACT
This study provides insights on the attributes of a tax that are measured 
by two different classes of progressivity indices – those defined by 
Kakwani (1977), Suits (1977), Stroup (2005), and Mathews (2016) and 
those defined by Musgrave & Thin (1948) and Reynolds & Smolensky 
(1977). Index values are determined for the U.S. Federal Income Tax 
from 1929 through 2010. These values illustrate that the indices of 
Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews gauge the progressivity of the tax, 
while those of Musgrave & Thin and Reynolds & Smolensky measure the 
redistributive capacity of the tax. In the early 1940s the progressivity of 
this tax significantly decreased at the same time when the redistributive 
capacity of the tax significantly increased. Since the mid-1970s this tax 
has (i) been more progressive than it was from the early 1950s through 
the mid-1970s and (ii) redistributed income to a greater degree than it 
did from the early 1950s through the mid-1970s.
Keywords: income taxation, progressivity measures, progressivity indices, income 
redistribution, U.S. tax policy
JEL: H20, H24, D31
1 Introduction
In order for governments to function, it is necessary for them to raise 
revenues. Thus, both scholars and practitioners of Public Administration 
must be concerned with government revenue generation. In most developed 
countries, the bulk of government revenues presently comes from income 
taxes. For example, in the U.S. in 2013, 91% of Federal Government revenues 
were attributed to income taxes and payroll taxes.1 The primary importance 
of income taxation for government revenue holds even for countries 
1	 See	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	(2015;	p.	7).
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which have Value Added Taxes. In Slovenia as of 2013, 60% of government 
revenues resulted from income taxes and social security contributions.2
In recent decades, the levels and structures of taxation in many countries have 
changed dramatically. Focusing on income taxes, the common trend has been 
for countries to reduce Marginal Tax Rates (MTR, defined as the percentage 
of the next dollar earned that must be paid in taxes) while broadening the 
tax base. As argued by Lazović-Pita (2015), this change in policy reflects a 
shift toward efficiency (over equity) in income taxation. A reduction of MTRs, 
particularly at the high end of the income scale, makes a tax less progressive 
and ultimately results in a distribution of income with greater inequality.
A tax is progressive if the Average Tax Rate (ATR, defined as the amount paid 
in taxes divided by income) increases as income increases. While there has 
long been agreement on this basic definition of progressivity, scholars have 
yet to settle on an accepted measure of the degree of progressivity of a tax. 
Consider the U.S. Federal Income Tax. From an inspection of either MTRs or 
the resulting ATRs of different segments of taxpayers, this tax has always 
been a progressive tax.3 However, it is not clear when this tax was “most 
progressive.” Further, different measures of progressivity yield conflicting 
insights, often because they are measuring different attributes of the impact 
of a tax. The present study contributes to this ongoing discussion by arguing 
that two well established and widely used indices of progressivity are in fact 
better thought of as measures of the redistributive capacity of a tax.
Kiefer (2005) offers an insightful discussion of the numerous approaches used 
to measure the degree of progressivity of a tax. The present study focuses on 
indices which Kiefer calls “distributional” indices, the value of which depends 
on both the tax rate structure and the distribution of income within the 
population subject to the tax.4 More precisely, the present study considers 
distributional indices defined in terms of “concentration curves” (such as the 
well-known Lorenz Curve).
Two of the earliest measures of this type were developed by Musgrave and Thin 
(1948) – the index of “effective progression” – and Reynolds and Smolensky 
(1977). These two distinct measures are each defined as a function of the 
pre-tax and post-tax values of the Gini-Coefficient. Thus, the dependence of 
each index on the pre-tax and post-tax Lorenz Curves is clear. Subsequently, 
several other tax progressivity indices based on the relation between 
2 This figure is exactly equal to the OECD average, although the breakdown between these 
three revenue categories differs between Slovenia and the OECD as a whole. See OECD 
(2014).
3 Tax Foundation (2009a) reports relevant MTRs for each year over the entire history of this 
tax; the final table in Tax Foundation (2009b) summarizes realized ATRs for different income 
groups for each year from 1980 to 2008.
4 In contrast, the value of a “structural” index depends upon only the tax structure but not 
upon the distribution of income. Musgrave & Thin (1948) examine common structural indices, 
including measures of “average rate progression”, “marginal rate progression”, “liability 
progression”, and “residual income progression.”
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an “income concentration curve” and a “tax concentration curve” were defined 
by Kakwani (1977), Suits (1977), Stroup (2005), and Mathews (2016).5,6
Recognize that a progressive tax (i) places a disproportionate amount of 
the burden of paying the tax on high income individuals, thereby (ii) making 
the final distribution of income more equal. Any distributional progressivity 
index essentially gauges the impact of the tax with respect to these 
two closely related outcomes. As noted by de Sarralde, Garcimartin, and 
Ruiz-Huerta (2013), Kakwani’s index and Reynolds & Smolensky’s index 
measure fundamentally different attributes of a tax: Kakwani’s index 
quantifies the “progressivity” of the tax by computing the “disproportionality 
of tax payments relative to pre-tax incomes”, whereas Reynolds & Smolensky’s 
index quantifies the “redistributive capacity” of the tax by measuring “the 
difference between pre- and post-tax income distributions” (p. 326).
Using this observation by de Sarralde et al. (2013) as motivation, the aim of 
the present study is to clearly illustrate how different progressivity indices 
measure distinct characteristics of a tax. Numerical values of various indices 
are computed for the U.S. Federal Income Tax from 1929 through 2010. 
Observing index values over such a long period of time (during which there 
were significant changes in both the fraction of the population subject to 
paying the tax and total taxes paid as a percentage of societal income) allows 
us to gain insight into what is actually being measured by each index. Based 
upon observed values, it is argued that while the indices of Kakwani, Suits, 
Stroup, and Mathews gauge “progressivity”, the indices of Musgrave/Thin 
and Reynolds/Smolensky are better thought of as measures of “redistributive 
capacity”.
This is not to say that the indices of Musgrave/Thin and Reynolds/Smolensky 
are not useful. On the contrary, which class of indices is more insightful 
depends upon what questions one would like to address (i.e., what aspects 
of policy one is trying to assess). For example, someone who wants to gauge 
how the burden of financing government spending is spread over different 
segments of the population could look at the values of the measures of 
Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews to make this assessment. Alternatively, 
someone who thinks that tax policy should reduce income inequality 
5 Two other measures of this type were developed by Khetan and Poddar (1976). But, as 
explained within Mathews (2016), one of Khetan and Poddar’s measures can be expressed as 
a monotonic transformation of Suits’ index while the other can be expressed as a monotonic 
transformation of Stroup’s index.
6 Additional alternative approaches for assessing progressivity have been offered by: Baum 
(1987) who develops the notion of “relative share adjustment” to measure how a tax alters 
the share of income realized by different segments of society; Allen & Campbell (1994) 
who examine the difference in average tax rate between very high income households and 
moderate income households; and Piketty & Saez (2007) who examine and compare levels of 
average tax rate across groups of taxpayers with different levels of income, paying particular 
attention to individuals at the high end of the income scale. In contrast to the indices examined 
in the present study, these alternative approaches do not make any attempt to construct a 
single dimensional progressivity measure.
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could look to the measures of Musgrave/Thin and Reynolds/Smolensky to see 
if the tax is indeed helping to achieve their desired objective.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A brief overview of the 
six indices which serve as our focus is presented in Section 2. A discussion of 
the computation of numerical values of these indices is offered in Section 
3. Index values for the U.S. Federal Income Tax from 1929 through 2010 are 
examined in Section 4. The observations made within this discussion support 
the claim that while the indices of Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews gauge 
“progressivity”, the indices of Musgrave/Thin and Reynolds/Smolensky are 
better thought of as measures of “redistributive capacity”. Section 5 briefly 
concludes.
2 Definitions and Previously Observed Values of Indices
A detailed discussion of the definitions and relations between the four indices 
of Kakwani (K), Suits (S), Stroup (St), and Mathews (M) is provided within 
Mathews (2016). Each of these four indices is defined as a ratio of areas in 
relation to plots of an “income concentration curve” (which summarizes how 
incomes are allocated over the population, ordered from lowest income 
earners to highest income earners) and a “tax concentration curve” (which 
summarizes how tax payments are allocated over the population, ordered 
from lowest income earners to highest income earners). The antecedent in 
each index (i.e., the first term in the ratio) is a weighted difference between 
income and taxes paid over the population being taxed. For K and St different 
segments of the population are weighted equally, while for S and M different 
segments of the population are weighted by their marginal contribution 
to cumulative income. For S and St the consequent (i.e., the second term 
in the ratio) is a similarly weighted value of income, while for K and M the 
consequent is a similarly weighted value of population.7 As defined, each 
index can range in value between 0 and 1, with a larger value corresponding 
to taxation outcomes that are more progressive.
Both Musgrave & Thin’s index (MT) and Reynolds & Smolensky’s index (RS) 
are direct functions of the pre-tax and post-tax values of the Gini coefficient.8 
Letting GI denote the initial (i.e., pre-tax) value of the Gini coefficient and 
GF denote the final (i.e., post tax) value of the Gini coefficient, Reynolds & 
Smolensky’s index) is simply RS = GI – GF and Musgrave & Thin’s index is 
simply MT = (1 – GI) /(1 – GF). Under a progressive tax individuals with higher 
incomes have higher Average Tax Rates. This results in a reduction in income 
7 For a graphical depiction of these curves and a more detailed discussion of these definitions, 
see Mathews (2016).
8 The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of income inequality. It is defined in 
relation to the income concentration curve with respect to population (i.e., a curve which 
illustrates the relation between cumulative fraction of population and their corresponding 
cumulative fraction of societal income) as the ration of the area between this concentration 
curve and the 45°-line to the entire are below the 45°-line. The value of the Gini coefficient 
ranges between 0 and 1, with a smaller value revealing less income inequality.
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inequality and is reflected by a decrease in the value of the Gini coefficient. 
Consequently, for a progressive tax: GF < GI, implying RS > 0 and MT > 1. In 
order to have values of these two indices which are on a comparable scale, 
consider a simple additive transformation of Musgrave & Thin’s index: 
MT = MT – 1. Note that MT = RS/(1 – GI), from which it is apparent that the 
value of both RS and MT is positive for a progressive tax.
Numerical values of St, S, K, and M for the U.S. Federal Income Tax have 
previously been determined by numerous researchers, including: Kakwani 
(1977) using his measure for 1968, 1969, and 1970; Suits (1977) using 
his measure for 1966 and 1970; Stroup (2005) using his measure for 1980 
through 2000; Mathews (2016) using all four measures for 1987 through 
2010; and Mathews (2014) using all four measures for 1929 through 2009.9 
The Congressional Budget Office (2012) reports values of K and RS for both 
the U.S. Federal Income Tax and all federal taxes from 1979 through 2009. 
Stroup (2005), the Congressional Budget Office (2012), and Mathews (2014 
and 2016) each present evidence to support a claim that the U.S. Federal 
Income Tax has become more progressive in recent decades. But while the 
Congressional Budget Office analysis does suggest that the U.S. Federal 
Income Tax became more progressive between 1979 and 2009, it also reveals 
that the progressivity of all federal taxes has either increased less substantially 
(based upon Kakwani’s index) or not changed much at all (based upon Reynolds 
& Smolensky’s index) over this time (see Congressional Budget Office (2012), 
Supplemental Table 9). This final observation is important because it begins 
to reveal how the distinct measures of Kakwani and of Reynolds & Smolensky 
can yield observations on changes in the degree of progressivity over time 
which appear to be at odds with one another.
In addition to determining values of his index for the U.S., Kakwani (1977) 
computes values for Australia (for 1968 through 1972), Canada (for 1968 
through 1970), and the United Kingdom (for 1964 through 1967). His results 
suggest that during these years income taxation in these four countries 
was least progressive in the U.S. and most progressive in the U.K. Khetan 
and Poddar (1976) determine numeric values of two different indices (one 
is a monotonic transformation of Suits’ index and the other is a monotonic 
transformation of Stroup’s index) for Canada from 1961 through 1971. 
Their results suggest that federal income taxation in Canada became less 
progressive during these years. More recently, Verbist and Figari (2013) 
9 It is important to stress that the present study focuses solely on the U.S. Federal Income 
Tax and does not encompass other federal taxes (e.g., payroll, estate, and corporate taxes). 
Clearly, the overall progressivity of all federal taxes could differ from that of the Federal 
Income Tax. Piketty and Saez (2007) argue that the U.S. Federal tax system as a whole became 
less progressive between 1960 and 2004, due to an increased significance of fairly regressive 
payroll taxes and a diminished significance of highly progressive corporate and estate taxes. 
But, it is important to recognize that Piketty and Saez do not consider any of the four income/
tax concentration based distributional indices which are the primary focus here. Rather, they 
present a broad, general discussion of trends over time in average tax rates and the after tax 
position of different segments of the population (with an emphasis on subsets at the high end 
of the income scale, such as the “top 1%”, “top 0.1%” and “top 0.01%”).
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compute values of Kakwani’s index for the EU15 in 1998 and 2008. Their 
analysis reveals tremendous variation in tax progressivity across these 15 
countries, with the most progressive outcomes found in Ireland and the least 
progressive outcomes found in Denmark and Sweden.
3 Computations of Index Values
Focusing on the U.S. Federal Income Tax, numerical values of St, S, K, M, 
MT, and RS are determined for every year between 1929 and 2010. In order 
to compute these values, it is necessary to construct various concentration 
curves.10 The bulk of the data used to construct these curves was obtained 
from the Internal Revenue Service’s “Statistics of Income” report for each 
relevant year.11 Each report summarizes the number of tax returns filed, the 
amount of income represented on the filed tax returns, and the amount of 
taxes paid (broken down by taxpayer income levels). For example, the data 
reported in Table 3 on Pages 68–70 of the “Statistics of Income for 1932” 
show that in this year 3,877,430 returns were filed, and that the people filing 
these returns collectively had a combined net income of $11,655,756,678 and 
collectively had to pay $329,962,311 in Federal Income Taxes.12 As an example 
of how this data is further broken down by taxpayer income levels, Table 3 
of the “Statistics of Income for 1932” further reveals that in this year people 
with net incomes of $2,000 or less collectively filed a total of 1,849,277 
returns, had a combined net income of $2,376,974,549 and had a combined 
tax obligation of $12,357,186.
When constructing the relevant concentration curves, it is necessary to define 
(either explicitly or implicitly) the population over which the index values are 
to be determined. If the population of interest is simply those people filing tax 
returns, then the curves can be constructed and the index values determined 
from solely the data in the “Statistics of Income” reports. This is the approach 
taken by Kakwani (1977), Suits (1977), Stroup (2005), Congressional Budget 
Office (2012), and Mathews (2016). However, if the true desire is a measure 
of the degree of progressivity over the entire population, then focusing on 
only those individuals filing returns has shortcomings. First, if individuals with 
incomes below a certain level are not even required to file a return (as has 
always been the case for the U.S. Federal Income Tax), then this approach 
ultimately understates the degree of progressivity at each point in time. 
Second, if the fraction of adults required to file a return changes dramatically, 
10 To compute K, S, St, and M it is necessary to construct a “tax concentration curve with 
respect to population”, an “income concentration curve with respect to population”, a 
“tax concentration curve with respect to income”, and a “population concentration curve 
with respect to income” for each year. Similarly, to compute RS, and MT it is necessary to 
additionally construct a “post tax income concentration curve with respect to population”.
11 All reports can be accessed through http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2. For example, 
“Statistics of Income for 1932” is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/32soirepar.pdf.
12 Table 1 (presented in the Appendix of the paper) provides a summary of these values (along 
with the values of several other variables of interest) for the time period under consideration. 
In the interest of brevity, these values are reported for only every other year between 1929 
and 2010.
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then focusing only on this restricted population could give misleading results 
when examining how the degree of progressivity has evolved over time.
Using additional data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. 
Census Bureau, Mathews (2014) constructed concentration curves and 
computed index values over the entire adult population. This is the first study 
to truly gauge the progressivity of the U.S. Federal Income Tax over the entire 
population, and not over just people filing tax returns. A similar approach is 
used in the present study.
For each year from 1929 through 2010, data on total Personal Income for 
the U.S. were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and estimates 
of the total adult population in the U.S. were obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.13 These figures are reported for every other year between 1930 
and 2010 in the columns labeled “Total Societal Income” and “Total Adult 
Population” in Table 1 (presented in the Appendix of the paper). It is worth 
noting that the present study uses data on Personal Income collected after the 
comprehensive revision of national income accounts which was undertaken 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2013, whereas Mathews (2014) used 
data on Personal Income collected before this comprehensive revision. As 
a consequence, the numerical values of St, S, K, and M which are obtained 
differ between the two studies.
Returning attention to the “Statistics of Income Reports,” the total number of 
adults represented on all filed tax returns was determined in each year (see 
“Adults Represented on Returns” in Table 1). From here, the percentage of 
all adults represented on a filed tax return was computed for each year (see 
“Percentage of Adults on Returns” in Table 1).
Following an approach first used by Suits (1977), each of the five relevant 
concentration curves for each year is constructed as a piecewise linear function 
passing through each relevant pair of values and the implicit endpoints of 
(0,0) and (1,1). For the resulting piecewise linear concentration curves, the 
relevant areas between the various curves each consist of a collection of 
triangles and trapezoids.
As was done in Mathews (2014), when constructing the concentration curves 
which depend upon income the income not represented on filed tax returns 
(i.e., the residual income of society) is allocated equally across the total adult 
population. As an example, in 1944 a total of 46,919,590 tax returns were 
filed for 71,270,340 adults. The total adult population in this year, based upon 
U.S. Census Bureau estimates, was 97,153,352. Thus, roughly 26.64% of the 
adult population was not represented on a filed tax return and, therefore, 
13 The former figures were obtained from http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm, and the 
latter figures were obtained from http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html.
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did not pay any income taxes.14 Consequently, the starting point for the tax 
concentration curve with respect to population is the point (0.2664, 0). Those 
individuals filing tax returns had a combined net income of $116,714,736,000, 
whereas total societal income was $169,700,000,000. Thus, the residual 
income of society was $52,985,264,000, roughly 31.22% of total societal 
income. Allocating this residual income equally over the entire adult 
population, it follows that the 26.64% of the population not represented on 
a filed tax return accounted for approximately 0.2664 × 0.3122 ≈ 0.0832 of 
total societal income. Consequently, the first segment of the income 
concentration curve with respect to population extends from the origin 
through the point (0.2664, 0.0832). Following this approach, each 
relevant concentration curve is constructed for each year. From here, it is 
straightforward to determine numerical values of St, S, K, M, MT, and RS in 
each year from 1929 to 2010.
4 An Examination of Index Values
For each year from 1929 through 2010, the resulting values (determined 
using the data and approach described in Section 3) of St, S, K, and M are 
reported in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 1. Similarly, values of MT and RS are 
reported in Table 3 and plotted in Figure 215.
4.1 Observations on St, S, K, and M
Focusing first on St, S, K, and M, an inspection of Table 2 and Figure 1 reveals 
general trends in the degree of progressivity which are very similar to those 
discussed in Mathews (2014).16 For example, just as in Mathews (2014), 
St identifies 1929 and S, K, and M each identify 1931 as the year of most 
progressive taxation outcomes, while all four indices identify 1969 as the year 
of least progressive taxation outcomes over this period. Additionally, there 
is a consistent trend toward taxation outcomes that are increasingly more 
progressive from the late 1960s up to the present day. As a consequence, 
taxation outcomes in recent years are more progressive than at any point in 
time post World War II. In 2009 the value of: St was greater than in every year 
from 1942 onward; S was greater than in every year from 1943 onward; K 
was greater than in every year from 1943 onward; and M was greater than 
in every year from 1944 onward. Furthermore, for each index, the second 
largest value over this same time period was realized in 2010.
14 Since some people who file a tax return but do not ultimately have a positive tax burden, the 
percentage of the total population that paid no income tax would be greater than 26.64%. 
That is, this figure of 26.64% represents the minimum percentage of the population that paid 
no income taxes.
15 Tables are presented in the Appendix of the paper.
16 This should not be surprising, since the only difference between the values of St, S, K, and 
M in Mathews (2014) and the present study is that the latter were computed using data on 
Personal Income collected after the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ most recent comprehensive 
revision of national income accounts. As a result, while the obtained numerical values of St, S, 
K, and M differ between the two studies, for the most part the differences are minimal.
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These results are qualitatively consistent with Mathews (2016) which finds 
that over the period from 1987 through 2010, the U.S. Federal Income Tax 
was most progressive in 2009 (according to each of these four indices). Recall, 
however, that Mathews (2016) – as well as all other studies cited, with the 
exception of Mathews (2014) – effectively computes index values over only 
taxpayers (as opposed to over the entire population). Consequently, the index 
values reported in Mathews (2016) are numerically smaller than those reported 
here.17 Similarly, the resulted reported here are qualitatively consistent with 
those of Stroup (2005), where values of St were computed for each year from 
1980 through 2000. Over this time period, both the present study and Stroup 
identify 1981 as the year of least progressive taxation and 2000 as the year 
of most progressive taxation. Furthermore, according to the findings of both 
studies, there was a sizable jump in the degree of progressivity between 
1992 and 1993, causing all outcomes from 1993 through 2000 to be more 
progressive than all outcomes between 1980 and 1992. Finally, the present 
results are broadly consistent with those of the Congressional Budget Office 
(2012) study, which, based upon computed values of K, finds that taxation 
outcomes became more progressive between 1979 and 2009.
Figure 1: Indices of Progressivity
Source: Author’s calculations (as reported in Table 2).
While taxation outcomes in recent years appear to be the most progressive 
in several decades, they are by no means the most progressive over the 
entire history of the U.S. Federal Income Tax. As noted above, St identifies 
17 Since index values are computed over different populations in the present study and the bulk 
of the existing literature, comparisons of numeric values across studies are difficult to make. 
This is particularly true for the studies such as Kakwani (1977) and Suits (1977), which only 
report index values for the U.S. Federal Income Tax for three and two years respectively.
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1929 and S, K, and M each identify 1931 as the year of most progressive 
taxation outcomes. As can be seen from an inspection of Figure 1, during the 
early 1940s there was a dramatic transformation in the degree of progressivity. 
Each of these four indices decreased considerably in 1941, 1942, and 1943. 
Consequently, for each index, the largest realized value from 1942 onward 
is less than the smallest realized value between 1929 and 1941.18 These 
observations reveal that the early 1940s was a point of demarcation between 
an initial period of very progressive taxation and a subsequent period of 
relatively less progressive taxation.
This shift was driven in large part by the significant increase in the percentage 
of the population subject to paying the tax which occurred at this time. 
Because of the fact that some people must file a tax return even though they 
ultimately do not have to pay any taxes, the percentage of adults represented 
on tax returns is not the same as the percentage of adults who must pay the 
tax. But, the former provides an upper bound on the value of the latter (i.e., the 
percentage of adults who are subject to paying the tax must be less than the 
percentage of adults represented on tax returns). Between 1929 and 1936, 
less than 10% of the adult population was represented on filed tax returns, 
implying that less than 10% of the population was subject to paying the tax. 
During the years in which the degree of progressivity sharply increased, the 
percentage of adults represented on filed tax returns abruptly increased from 
12.06% in 1939, to 24.03% in 1940, to 42.85% in 1941, to 59.99% in 1942, 
and to 68.59% in 1943. The percentage of adults represented on filed tax 
returns reached 73.36% in 1944 and has remained above this level in every 
year since. The dramatic transformation in the degree of progressivity which 
occurred in the early 1940s coincided with the conversion of the U.S. Federal 
Income Tax from a tax levied only on very high income earners to a tax levied 
on the masses.
From an inspection of the index values reported in Table 2 (and plotted in 
Figure 1), we can begin to make some casual insights on how the degree 
of progressivity is related to political leadership. For example, the dramatic 
decline in the degree of progressivity which occurred in the early 1940s took 
place when President Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat, occupied the White 
House. More recently, we observe sizable increases in the value of each 
progressivity index in 1993, 2002, and 2009. In each of these years there was 
a significant change in the tax code. The “Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993” (OBRA-93), signed into law by Democrat President William 
Clinton, created higher MTRs of 36.0% and 39.6% at the upper-end of the 
income distribution, while leaving MTRs on lower levels of income essentially 
unchanged. These changes should make outcomes more progressive. The 
“Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001” (EGTRRA-01), 
enacted by Republican President George W. Bush, decreased MTRs across 
18 For each index, a similar statement also holds with either 1940 or 1941 as the relevant cutoff 
(instead of 1942).
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the board. Most significantly, it established a new 10% tax bracket at the 
lowest end of the income scale (on a portion of income which had previously 
been taxed at a MTR of 15%). Additionally, compared to the rates in place 
in 2000, EGTRRA-01 decreased the MTRs above the 15% bracket by one 
percentage point. Since the reduction of the initial MTR from 15% to 10% is 
more drastic than the reduction of the higher MTRs by one percentage point, 
the changes from EGTRRA-01 should likely make outcomes more progressive. 
Finally, the increase in progressivity which occurred in 2009 was due in part 
to the temporary Making Work Pay tax credit (signed into law by Democrat 
President Barack Obama) which was in place for low and middle income 
taxpayers in 2009 and 2010.
Over the entire time period from 1929 through 2010 higher degrees of 
progressivity were realized when Democrat presidents were in power than 
when Republican presidents were in power. To this point, the mean value 
of S was 19.03% higher in the years when a Democrat was President than 
in the years when a Republican was president (taking on a mean value of 
0.44235 under Republican presidents versus 0.52654 under Democrat 
presidents). Based upon running a simple OLS regression with the value of 
S as the dependent variable and a dummy variable for “Democrat president” 
as the single independent variable, this difference in mean value is statistically 
significant at the 5% error level (the p-value for this regression is 0.03909).19
While these observations are worth making, they should not be interpreted 
to mean that there is a direct causal relation between political party of the 
current president and degree of tax progressivity. After all, a president is 
never able to enact his preferred policies unchecked. The results summarized 
above in no way account for when a president was working with a congress 
of his own party, a congress of the rival party, or a split congress. Further, as 
measured by St, S, K, and M, the degree of progressivity depends upon not 
just the tax code, but also upon both levels of and the distribution of income. 
The impact of public policy on these outcomes is less immediate and direct. 
To this point, changes in policy (both related and unrelated to the tax code) 
enacted in one year will likely impact economic outcomes for years to come.20 
The simple, preliminary insights offered above make no attempt to address 
these concerns.
19 Similarly, the mean values of St, M, and K were respectively 11.48%, 20.45%, and 14.39% 
higher under Democrat presidents than under Republican presidents. However, based upon 
similar OLS regressions, the difference in mean for St and M is statistically significant at only 
the 10% error level (the associated p-values are 0.06651 and 0.06057 respectively), while the 
difference in K is not statistically significant (the associated p-value is 0.10960).
20 In fact, it could even be the case that people begin to alter their behavior prior to policies being 
enacted or a politician coming to power (based upon changed perceptions of the likelihood 
of different future events). For example, Halcoussis, Lowenberg, and Phillips (2009) conduct 
a detailed empirical analysis of stock market and public opinion data in advance of the 2008 
U.S. Presidential election, providing evidence that changes in stock market outcomes were 
caused by (rather than causing) changes in the perceived likelihood of an electoral victory by 
President Obama.
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A comparison of the degree of tax progressivity in the U.S. (based upon the 
findings of the present study) to other countries (based upon the findings 
of Kakwani (1977), Khetan and Poddar (1976), or Verbist and Figari (2013)) 
is somewhat difficult because of the facts that these other studies: (i) report 
index values for much shorter periods of time and (ii) compute index values 
over different segments of the population (i.e., over taxpayers, not all adults). 
However, as noted above, (insomuch as comparisons can be made) the present 
results are broadly consistent with previous studies. Recall that Kakwani 
observed that in the 1960s income taxation in the U.S. was less progressive 
than in Australia, Canada, and the U.K. For the EU15 countries, Verbist and 
Figari computed values of K that ranged from 0.0891 (Sweden) to 0.2676 
(Ireland) in 1998 and from 0.0816 (Denmark) to 0.3205 (Ireland) in 2008. The 
values of K reported in Table 2 for the U.S. in these years are 0.34372 and 
0.39121 respectively, which are higher than the values for Ireland in each year. 
However, due to the differences in segments of the population over which 
the index values are computed, the values of K reported in Mathews (2016) – 
values of 0.1575 in 1998 and 0.1995 in 2008 – are more comparable to those 
determined by Verbist and Figari. Based upon these values, in comparison to 
the EU15 countries, in terms of degree of progressivity the U.S. would have 
ranked 9th in 1998 and 5th in 2008.
Finally recognize that when considering tax structures across countries, there 
is the potential for “tax competition” between administrative jurisdictions. 
As defined by Klun (2006, p. 7), tax competition is “competition between 
national economies to increase their competitiveness and attract foreign 
investment by means of their tax policy”. Part of the shift toward lower 
MTRs – and, consequently, taxation outcomes that can be broadly described 
as less progressive – which has occurred in several countries (including the 
U.S.) in recent decades could be a result of tax competition, as countries vie 
for highly skilled workers and profitable corporations.
4.2 Observations on MT and RS
Switching attention to MT and RS, an inspection of Table 3 and Figure 2 
immediately reveals that the values of these indices have varied greatly over 
time. Again, index values changed dramatically in the early 1940s. But, in stark 
contrast to the insights obtained within Subsection 4.1, numerical values for 
these two indices are much lower before the 1940s than at any time since.21 
As will be explained, this seemingly contradictory insight results because in 
the early 1940s there was a dramatic and sudden increase in the fraction of 
the total population subject to the income tax. The accompanying discussion 
will elucidate precisely what each class of indices primarily measures – the 
four indices examined in Subsection 4.1 quantify the progressivity of the 
tax burden (i.e., the degree to which the burden of paying the tax is borne 
21 However, these two additional indices reinforce the observation that the time-period from 
the early 1950s onward can be divided into an initial period of relatively low progressivity 
followed by a more recent period of relatively high progressivity.
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by high income individuals), whereas those developed by Musgrave & Thin 
and Reynolds & Smolensky quantify the redistributive capacity of the tax (i.e., 
the degree to which the tax alters the distribution of income).
Figure 2: Indices of Redistributive Capacity
Source: Author’s calculations (as reported in Table 3).
The values of MT and RS provide insights which are similar to each other 
but in part contrast greatly with some of the results discussed in Subsection 
4.1. For the period from 1929 through 2010, both MT and RS achieved their 
minimum value in 1931. While MT and RS did not achieve their maximum 
values over this time period in the same year (the largest value of MT was 
0.08169, which occurred in 2000; the largest value of RS was 0.04905, which 
occurred in 1943), they tended to realize relatively large values in common 
years. For example, for each index the realized value in the three years of 
1943, 1999, and 2000 ranked among the four highest values over this 82 year 
time period.22 This correlation between the values of MT and RS should not 
be surprising, since, after all, there is a close relation between the definitions 
of the two measures: MT = RS/(1 – GI).
Observe that the values of both MT and RS increased abruptly in 1941, 1942, 
and 1943. Moreover, for each of these two indices every single realized value 
from 1942 onward is greater than every single realized value between 1929 
and 1941.23 Thus, each of these two measures also suggests that the early 
1940s is a point in time of demarcation. Furthermore, if we think of each 
22 Similarly, for each index the realized value in the five years of 1943, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 
2001 ranked among the six highest values over this 82 year time period.
23 For each index a similar statement would also hold with 1941 as the cut-off year instead of 
1942.
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class of measures as indices of progressivity, then the observations seem 
to contradict one another – in Subsection 4.1 it was observed that taxation 
outcomes before this time were much more progressive than outcomes since, 
whereas the present observations appear to suggest that taxation outcomes 
before this time were much less progressive than outcomes since.
Finally, as was done for the previous class of indices, an attempt can be 
made to determine if there is any relation between the realized values of MT 
and RS and political leadership. Between 1929 and 2010, the mean values 
of both MT and RS were actually smaller under Democrat presidents than 
under Republican presidents (6.70% and 6.08% lower, respectively).24 Again, 
if we think of each class of measures as indices of progressivity, then these 
observations seem to present a contradiction – in Subsection 4.1 we observed 
that taxation outcomes were more progressive when Democrat presidents 
were in office, whereas the present observations appear to suggest that 
taxation outcomes were less progressive when Democrat presidents were in 
office.
4.3 Disproportionality of Tax Payments Versus Redistributive 
Capacity
These apparently contradictory observations of Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 can 
be reconciled by scrutinizing the fundamental difference between what St, S, 
K, and M measure and what MT and RS measure. Recognize that a progressive 
tax: (i) places a disproportionate amount of the burden of paying the tax on 
high income individuals and (ii) makes the final distribution of income more 
equal. Any distributional progressivity index essentially gauges the realized 
performance of the tax with respect to these two closely related (but distinct) 
outcomes. As noted by de Sarralde et al. (2013), Kakwani’s index and Reynolds 
& Smolensky’s index measure fundamentally different attributes of a tax: 
Kakwani’s index quantifies the “progressivity” of the tax by computing the 
“disproportionality of tax payments relative to pre-tax incomes,” whereas 
Reynolds & Smolensky’s index quantifies the “redistributive capacity” of 
the tax by measuring “the difference between pre- and post-tax income 
distributions” (p. 326). These characterizations carry over to the similarly 
defined indices, so that St, S, K, and M each quantify the progressivity of the 
burden of the tax (i.e., the degree to which high income individuals bear the 
burden of paying the tax) whereas MT and RS each quantify the redistributive 
capacity of the tax (i.e., the degree to which the distribution of income is 
altered by the tax).
In order for a tax to substantially alter the distribution of income (i.e., to have 
a great redistributive capacity), two conditions must be met: (a) the burden 
24 However, neither difference in mean is statistically significant. The associated p-values for 
simple OLS regressions similar to those described in the previous sub-section are 0.38228 (for 
a regression with MT as the dependent variable) and 0.39423 (for a regression with RS as the 
dependent variable).
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of the tax must be disproportionately borne by one segment of the population 
(e.g., “high income individuals”) and (b) the tax itself must be sizable 
(i.e., significantly large, perhaps measured as a percentage of income taken 
by the tax). The indices which focus on the progressivity of the burden of the 
tax (i.e., St, S, K, and M) are only influenced by “condition (a),” not “condition 
(b).” That is, for St, S, K, and M the size of the tax system does not matter. 
However, for MT and RS the size of the tax system can matter quite a bit. 
This difference is encapsulated by a recent Congressional Budget Office 
study which observes that Kakwani’s index measures who bears the burden of 
paying the tax based upon “the shares of taxes paid and the shares of income 
received by different income groups” and is therefore “indifferent to the size 
of the tax system” (CBO, 2011, p. 42). In contrast, Reynolds & Smolensky’s 
index “measures the redistributive effect of the tax system” and is defined in 
a manner so as to be “a function of…the share of household income claimed 
by the tax system” (CBO, 2011, p. 42).
Thus, the seemingly contradictory observations made in Subsections 4.1. 
and 4.2 result because in the early 1940s (as reported in Table 1) there was a 
dramatic and sudden increase in both the “Percentage of Adults on Returns” 
(which provides an upper bound on the value of – and in some sense can 
also serve as a rough proxy measure for – the percentage of the population 
subject to the tax) and “Taxes Paid as a percentage of Societal Income” 
(which provides a measure of the size of the tax). As previously noted, the 
“Percentage of Adults on Returns” (which was below 10% in every year up 
through 1936) increased to 12.06% in 1939, 24.03% in 1940, 42.85% in 1941, 
59.99% in 1942, 68.59% in 1943, and 73.36% in 1944.25 This figure has been 
above 75% in every year since 1945 and above 80% in every year since 1950.
“Taxes Paid as a percentage of Societal Income” underwent a similarly 
dramatic change during these years. In 1939 this figure was 1.21% (and had 
been 1.75% or lower in every previous year). It then increased to 1.81% in 
1940, 3.90% in 1941, 6.96% in 1942, 10.87% in 1943, and 9.56% in 1944 (and 
has been above 7% in all but one year since 1942, the one exception being 
1949 when it was equal to 6.88%).26
When only a very small fraction of the population is subject to paying a 
progressive tax (as was the case for the U.S. Federal Income Tax before the 
early 1940s), the burden of the tax will clearly be borne disproportionately by 
high income individuals. The very high values of St, S, K, and M before the early 
1940s are simply a reflection of this fact. As the fraction of the population 
25 Recall, for brevity Table 1 only reports values for every other year between 1929 and 2010.
26 The initial climb in the early 1940s can be justified as a necessary means for financing the 
increased military spending by the government during World War II. National Defense 
Spending as a percentage of GDP in the U.S. increased from “less than 1 percent of GDP in 
1929 up to 43 percent in 1944” (Walker 2012, p. 6). But, when military spending returned 
to lower levels after World War II, “Taxes Paid as a percentage of Societal Income” remained 
high. Post World War II, National Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP “has ranged from 
a high of 15 percent in 1952 (during the Korean War) to a low of 3.7 percent in 2000” (Walker 
2012, p. 6).
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subject to the tax greatly expanded in the early 1940s, the burden of the tax 
was spread over a much wider portion of the population, illustrated by the 
dramatic decrease in the values of St, S, K, and M.
In terms of redistributive capacity, recall that in order for a tax to substantially 
alter the distribution of income the tax must be sizable. A tax that is relatively 
small (as was the U.S. Federal Income Tax before the early 1940s) will not be 
able to substantially alter the distribution of income, regardless of how the 
burden of the tax is spread over different segments of the population. The 
very low values of MT and RS prior to the early 1940s are a reflection of this 
fact. After the size of the tax was substantially increased in the early 1940s, 
the tax now had the potential to significantly alter the distribution of income. 
Since the burden of the tax was progressive (i.e., high income individuals bore 
a greater burden of paying the tax) both before and after this increase in the 
size of the tax, increasing the size of the tax resulted in a greater redistribution 
of income, illustrated by the dramatic increase in the values of MT and RS.
While these two different sets of indices provide essentially opposite insights 
on the degree of progressivity (i.e., the disproportionality of tax payments 
relative to incomes) and the redistributive capacity (i.e., degree to which the 
distribution of income is altered by the tax) of the U.S. Federal Income Tax 
before/after the early 1940s, they reveal similar trends in these two attributes 
since the early 1950s. An inspection of Table 2 reveals that: for St the minimum 
value from 1975 onward (of 0.53166 in 1975) is greater than the maximum 
value between 1951 and 1974 (of .52650 in 1951); for K the minimum value 
from 1975 onward (of 0.31537 in 1988) is greater than the maximum value 
between 1951 and 1974 (of 0.31526 in 1951); for S the minimum value from 
1975 onward (of 0.38296 in 1989) is greater than the maximum value between 
1955 and 1974 (of 0.37738 in 1955); and for M the minimum value from 1975 
onward (of 0.26794 in 1988) is greater than the maximum value between 
1956 and 1974 (of 0.26756 in 1958). A similar inspection of Table 3 reveals 
that for MT the minimum value from 1976 onward (of 0.05523 in 1991) is 
greater than the maximum value between 1948 and 1975 (of 0.05500 in 
1952). As for RS, the minimum value from 1975 onward (of 0.03261 in 1991) 
is greater than all but one realized value between 1953 and 1974 (the one 
exception being a realized value of 0.03267 in 1969).
Thus, the period from the early 1950s through 2010 can be separated 
into two distinct periods with respect to both degree of progressivity and 
redistributive capacity. From the mid-1970s through 2010 the U.S. Federal 
Income Tax (i) has been more progressive than it was from the early 1950s 
through the mid-1970s (based upon the preceding observations from Table 
2) and (ii) has redistributed income to a greater degree than it did from the 
early 1950s through the mid-1970s (based upon the preceding observations 
from Table 3). In contrast to the divergent observations which emerged for 
the early 1940s, we see that since the early 1950s the degree of progressivity 
and the redistributive capacity have broadly shifted in conjunction with one 
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another. This is because since the early 1950s there has not been a sea change 
in either the percentage of the population subject to the tax or the size of the 
tax.27
5 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
The present study provides insights on the specific attributes of a tax that are 
truly being measured by six different previously defined progressivity indices. 
A progressive tax (i) places a disproportionate amount of the burden of paying 
the tax on high income individuals, thereby (ii) making the final distribution 
of income more equal. Related to this distinction, de Sarralde et al. (2013) 
made an insightful observation regarding how some tax progressivity indices 
quantify the degree to which the burden of paying the tax is borne by different 
segments of the population, while others simply quantify the degree to which 
the tax alters the distribution of income. Using this as motivation, numerical 
values of two different classes of progressivity indices (those previously 
defined by Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews and those previously defined 
by Musgrave & Thin and Reynolds & Smolensky) were determined over the 
entire adult population for the U.S. Federal Income Tax for each year from 
1929 through 2010.
Because index values have been computed over a period of time during which 
there were significant changes in both the fraction of the population subject 
to paying the tax and total taxes paid as a percentage of societal income, 
it is possible to gain insight on what is revealed by each index. It is argued 
that while the indices of Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews gauge the 
progressivity of the tax, those of Musgrave & Thin and Reynolds & Smolensky 
are actually measuring the redistributive capacity of the tax.
This does not imply that either class of indices is useless. Rather, it simply 
suggests that policy analysts must be thoughtful and aware of what the index 
is measuring. For example, to gain insight on how the burden of financing 
government spending is spread over different segments of the population, 
one should look at the values of the measures of Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and 
Mathews. Alternatively, to determine if a tax is significantly reducing income 
inequality, one should instead look at the measures of Musgrave/Thin and 
Reynolds/Smolensky.
To this point, the computed numerical values revealed that in the early 
1940s there was a dramatic and sudden shift in both the progressivity and 
redistributive capacity of the U.S. Federal Income Tax. As revealed by the 
measures of Kakwani, Suits, Stroup, and Mathews, the tax was much more 
progressive before this time than since. However, as revealed by the measures 
27 Recall, the “Percentage of Adults on Returns” (which recall, in some sense can serve as a rough 
proxy measure for the percentage of the population subject to the tax) has been above 80% 
in every year since 1950. Similarly, “Taxes Paid as a percentage of Societal Income” has been 
above 7% in all but one year since 1942 (the one exception being 1949 when it was equal to 
6.88%).
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of Musgrave/Thin and Reynolds/Smolensky, the redistributive capacity of the 
tax was much less before this time than since. Finally, it was noted that from 
the mid-1970s through 2010 the U.S. Federal Income Tax has (i) been more 
progressive than it was from the early 1950s through the mid-1970s and (ii) 
redistributed income to a greater degree than it did from the early 1950s 
through the mid-1970s. These observations can only be appreciated with a 
correct understanding of what is being measured by each class of indices. 
These distinctions are critical for policy analysts to recognize when using 
any such index as a “yardstick” for making normative assessments of policy 
outcomes.
Some preliminary insights were made on progressivity and redistributive 
capacity outcomes in relation to political leadership. The realized index values 
reveal that, on average, the U.S. Federal Income Tax was more progressive 
in years when a Democrat president was in office but redistributed income 
to a greater degree in years when a Republican president was in office. But, 
as noted within Subsection 4.1, these observations did not account for many 
important, complicating factors (e.g., whether a president was working with 
a congress of his own party, a congress of the rival party, or a split congress 
and also the relation between the timing of changes in policy/leadership and 
changes in behavior/outcomes). Further research into the relations between 
political leadership and policy outcomes would be useful.
Similarly, an attempt was made to compare the present empirical results 
for the U.S. Federal Income Tax to taxation outcomes in other countries (as 
measured by previous researchers). However, it was noted that doing so was 
somewhat problematic because other studies: (i) report index values for much 
shorter periods of time and (ii) compute index values over different segments 
of the population (i.e., over taxpayers, not all adults). These difficulties could 
be overcome by conducting more comprehensive and consistent analyses 
of taxation outcomes in other countries. This presents another ripe area for 
future research on these topics.
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Appendix
Table 1: Characteristics of Entire Population and Taxpayers
























1930 3,707,509 5,467,413 80,068,980 6.83 18,118.63 76,500 476.71 0.62
1932 3,877,430 5,715,530 82,294,743 6.95 11,655.76 50,300 329.96 0.66
1934 4,094,420 6,041,895 84,552,935 7.15 12,796.80 54,100 511.40 0.95
1936 5,413,499 7,806,332 86,791,801 8.99 19,240.11 69,200 1,214.02 1.75
1938 6,150,776 9,016,802 89,072,692 10.12 18,660.93 69,100 726.12 1.05
1940 14,598,074 22,054,506 91,764,122 24.03 36,309.72 79,400 1,440.97 1.81
1942 36,456,110 56,687,002 94,486,828 59.99 78,589.73 126,700 8,823.04 6.96
1944 46,919,590 71,270,340 97,153,352 73.36 116,714.74 169,700 16,216.40 9.56
1946 52,600,470 79,284,465 99,500,869 79.68 134,330.01 182,700 16,075.91 8.80
1948 51,745,697 81,767,812 102,066,436 80.11 164,173.86 213,700 15,441.53 7.23
1950 52,655,564 84,646,188 104,994,301 80.62 179,874.48 233,900 18,374.92 7.86
1952 56,107,089 89,275,281 107,054,753 83.39 216,087.45 282,700 28,019.85 9.91
1954 56,306,704 90,565,754 109,122,793 82.99 230,235.86 302,600 26,665.75 8.81
1956 58,798,843 94,785,760 111,353,676 85.12 268,583.81 348,400 32,732.13 9.39
1958 58,700,924 95,240,441 113,558,478 83.87 282,166.42 379,500 34,335.65 9.05
1960 60,592,712 97,920,550 116,145,687 84.31 316,557.57 422,500 39,464.16 9.34
1962 62,290,595 99,113,994 119,412,390 83.00 349,860.99 469,100 44,902.84 9.57
1964 64,943,284 103,397,210 122,205,737 84.61 398,212.08 528,400 47,152.86 8.92
1966 69,786,185 109,486,582 126,664,717 86.44 470,271.72 620,600 56,087.08 9.04
1968 73,347,156 114,465,362 130,814,842 87.50 556,304.96 730,700 76,637.90 10.49
1970 73,862,448 115,982,827 135,290,289 85.73 634,250.26 864,600 83,900.71 9.70
1972 77,132,295 119,976,528 140,476,487 85.41 748,924.77 1,023,600 93,563.91 9.14
1974 82,794,391 126,681,708 145,867,315 86.85 910,803.19 1,249,300 123,591.23 9.89
1976 84,123,626 128,211,299 151,783,587 84.47 1,060,805.81 1,498,100 141,762.54 9.46
1978 89,247,480 133,471,142 157,810,346 84.58 1,309,918.74 1,859,500 188,169.09 10.12
1980 93,238,823 138,162,282 164,041,304 84.22 1,626,554.50 2,316,800 250,240.23 10.80
1982 94,426,498 140,036,782 169,374,534 82.68 1,875,871.71 2,778,800 277,470.22 9.99
1984 98,435,000 145,262,569 173,865,591 83.55 2,173,227.61 3,281,300 301,504.20 9.19
1986 102,087,623 149,426,316 177,785,002 84.05 2,524,123.61 3,725,100 366,978.73 9.85
1988 108,872,859 156,585,859 181,774,324 86.14 3,124,156.07 4,275,300 412,761.07 9.65
1990 112,812,262 160,790,937 185,916,304 86.49 3,451,237.01 4,904,500 447,061.15 9.12
1992 112,652,759 160,275,207 190,392,429 84.18 3,680,552.02 5,410,800 476,162.76 8.80
1994 114,989,920 162,968,892 194,804,126 83.66 3,961,146.46 5,934,700 534,754.49 9.01
1996 119,441,768 167,893,322 199,441,923 84.18 4,590,527.29 6,661,900 658,124.17 9.88
1998 123,775,831 173,021,980 204,686,760 84.53 5,469,211.17 7,587,700 788,451.91 10.39
2000 128,227,143 178,065,242 209,786,222 84.88 6,423,976.61 8,632,800 980,521.36 11.36
2002 128,323,986 179,066,260 214,688,736 83.41 6,113,778.28 9,149,500 796,861.89 8.71
2004 130,371,156 181,798,654 219,507,563 82.82 6,875,123.35 10,049,200 831,890.27 8.28
2006 135,719,160 188,216,198 224,622,198 83.79 8,122,039.56 11,389,800 1,023,738.93 8.99
2008 139,960,581 192,867,886 229,989,364 83.86 8,426,625.37 12,430,600 1,031,511.65 8.30
2010 140,337,881 193,171,890 235,153,929 82.15 8,277,946.52 12,435,200 951,423.49 7.65
Source: Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 2: Indices of Progressivity
Year St S K M  Year St S K M
1929 0.99796 0.91012 0.71733 0.71036 1970 0.46086 0.34217 0.28281 0.24681
1930 0.99634 0.93682 0.76853 0.76248 1971 0.49120 0.36630 0.30063 0.26391
1931 0.99667 0.95034 0.79632 0.79128 1972 0.49731 0.37132 0.30323 0.26709
1932 0.98971 0.91864 0.76940 0.75138 1973 0.48533 0.36044 0.29738 0.25982
1933 0.99280 0.92723 0.76964 0.75706 1974 0.48039 0.35613 0.29448 0.25676
1934 0.99387 0.93754 0.76813 0.76401 1975 0.53166 0.39824 0.32952 0.28854
1935 0.99355 0.93486 0.76037 0.75716 1976 0.53489 0.40153 0.32888 0.28988
1936 0.99295 0.92176 0.72988 0.72871 1977 0.55130 0.41353 0.33817 0.29823
1937 0.99063 0.92163 0.72507 0.72679 1978 0.53818 0.40145 0.33120 0.28995
1938 0.98924 0.92551 0.73786 0.73797 1979 0.53639 0.40038 0.32882 0.28867
1939 0.98486 0.91159 0.69992 0.70703 1980 0.53419 0.39575 0.32700 0.28515
1940 0.96137 0.87613 0.58896 0.63150 1981 0.52683 0.38842 0.32586 0.28116
1941 0.83709 0.72355 0.49463 0.51348 1982 0.54037 0.39969 0.33571 0.28989
1942 0.67653 0.57086 0.44077 0.42333 1983 0.55616 0.41388 0.34671 0.30065
1943 0.60100 0.49825 0.40234 0.37447 1984 0.55700 0.41703 0.34926 0.30374
1944 0.58056 0.45558 0.35449 0.32790 1985 0.55874 0.41674 0.34864 0.30286
1945 0.60517 0.47261 0.36748 0.33933 1986 0.57746 0.42903 0.35254 0.30877
1946 0.60944 0.48376 0.36373 0.34476 1987 0.56252 0.40236 0.32849 0.28414
1947 0.54299 0.43013 0.32215 0.30577 1988 0.56052 0.38513 0.31537 0.26794
1948 0.58175 0.46122 0.34239 0.32677 1989 0.55536 0.38296 0.31956 0.26882
1949 0.57999 0.45802 0.34170 0.32464 1990 0.55859 0.38781 0.32564 0.27368
1950 0.57983 0.45829 0.34067 0.32446 1991 0.56949 0.40205 0.33627 0.28524
1951 0.52650 0.41111 0.31526 0.29339 1992 0.59814 0.42306 0.35161 0.29958
1952 0.49994 0.38751 0.30315 0.27806 1993 0.61668 0.44563 0.36653 0.31703
1953 0.47446 0.36634 0.29081 0.26411 1994 0.61958 0.44707 0.36795 0.31795
1954 0.50321 0.38819 0.30405 0.27811 1995 0.62356 0.44654 0.36509 0.31569
1955 0.49014 0.37738 0.29612 0.27035 1996 0.63099 0.44458 0.36022 0.31108
1956 0.47650 0.36566 0.28882 0.26233 1997 0.62574 0.42963 0.34630 0.29700
1957 0.46993 0.36014 0.28711 0.25927 1998 0.63248 0.42929 0.34372 0.29473
1958 0.48754 0.37152 0.29813 0.26756 1999 0.63436 0.42273 0.33330 0.28668
1959 0.47374 0.35856 0.28512 0.25645 2000 0.63750 0.41740 0.33055 0.28174
1960 0.46784 0.35342 0.28468 0.25399 2001 0.64721 0.44893 0.36442 0.31242
1961 0.47812 0.35861 0.28553 0.25564 2002 0.67517 0.48513 0.39331 0.34225
1962 0.46664 0.34838 0.28026 0.24895 2003 0.67789 0.48356 0.39404 0.34084
1963 0.46041 0.34306 0.27577 0.24486 2004 0.68423 0.47414 0.38254 0.32906
1964 0.47591 0.35702 0.28597 0.25518 2005 0.68926 0.46224 0.36897 0.31559
1965 0.48092 0.36231 0.28814 0.25863 2006 0.68773 0.45433 0.36397 0.30890
1966 0.46741 0.35100 0.28050 0.25074 2007 0.67855 0.43905 0.35099 0.29611
1967 0.46511 0.34839 0.27785 0.24839 2008 0.70031 0.48156 0.39121 0.33409
1968 0.46046 0.34355 0.27488 0.24486 2009 0.72834 0.52895 0.42555 0.37363
1969 0.44523 0.33124 0.26933 0.23743  2010 0.72645 0.51233 0.41229 0.35766
Minimum 0.44523 0.33124 0.26933 0.23743
(Year of Minimum) (1969) (1969) (1969) (1969)
Maximum 0.99796 0.95034 0.79632 0.79128
(Year of Maximum) (1929) (1931) (1931) (1931)
    Median 0.57347 0.42007 0.34118 0.29762
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 3: Indices of Redistributive Capacity
Year  MT = MT – 1 RS  Year  MT = MT – 1 RS
1929 0.01186 0.00853 1970 0.04953 0.03039
1930 0.00625 0.00482 1971 0.04954 0.03032
1931 0.00375 0.00300 1972 0.05003 0.03051
1932 0.00654 0.00508 1973 0.05090 0.03119
1933 0.00793 0.00615 1974 0.05274 0.03233
1934 0.00948 0.00733 1975 0.05328 0.03302
1935 0.01086 0.00831 1976 0.05591 0.03437
1936 0.01773 0.01303 1977 0.05893 0.03615
1937 0.01537 0.01125 1978 0.06059 0.03729
1938 0.01051 0.00784 1979 0.06172 0.03784
1939 0.01207 0.00858 1980 0.06469 0.03960
1940 0.01777 0.01089 1981 0.06472 0.04003
1941 0.03395 0.02006 1982 0.05994 0.03724
1942 0.05064 0.03299 1983 0.05654 0.03525
1943 0.07327 0.04905 1984 0.05636 0.03534
1944 0.06190 0.03743 1985 0.05701 0.03557
1945 0.06500 0.03947 1986 0.06311 0.03853
1946 0.05880 0.03509 1987 0.05789 0.03380
1947 0.05560 0.03299 1988 0.05990 0.03370
1948 0.04531 0.02667 1989 0.05743 0.03305
1949 0.04288 0.02526 1990 0.05602 0.03266
1950 0.04943 0.02904 1991 0.05523 0.03261
1951 0.05360 0.03209 1992 0.05772 0.03393
1952 0.05500 0.03335 1993 0.06027 0.03582
1953 0.05213 0.03195 1994 0.06136 0.03644
1954 0.04863 0.02938 1995 0.06450 0.03776
1955 0.04921 0.02973 1996 0.06917 0.03949
1956 0.04941 0.02995 1997 0.07212 0.03992
1957 0.04838 0.02956 1998 0.07334 0.03986
1958 0.04850 0.02966 1999 0.07831 0.04115
1959 0.05022 0.03022 2000 0.08169 0.04235
1960 0.04820 0.02933 2001 0.07095 0.03995
1961 0.05061 0.03023 2002 0.06441 0.03752
1962 0.04940 0.02967 2003 0.05801 0.03372
1963 0.04992 0.02990 2004 0.06175 0.03453
1964 0.04663 0.02802 2005 0.06659 0.03564
1965 0.04570 0.02738 2006 0.06792 0.03594
1966 0.04644 0.02787 2007 0.06958 0.03599
1967 0.04855 0.02900 2008 0.06337 0.03540
1968 0.05395 0.03221 2009 0.05623 0.03285
1969 0.05400 0.03267  2010 0.06019 0.03416
Minimum 0.00375 0.00300
(Year of Minimum) (1931) (1931)
Maximum 0.08169 0.04905
(Year of Maximum) (2000) (1943)
  Median 0.05450 0.03276
Source: Author’s calculations
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POVZETEK
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Ugotovitve glede ameriškega zveznega davka 
na dohodek za razlikovanje med merami 
progresivnosti in redistributivnosti
Davek je »progresiven«, če se povprečna davčna stopnja povečuje s 
povečevanjem dohodka. Čeprav se že dolgo strinjajo glede te osnovne 
definicije progresivnosti, se strokovnjaki še niso dogovorili glede stopnje 
davčne progresivnosti. Na primer, ameriški zvezni davek na dohodek: iz 
pregleda povečevanja bodisi mejnih davčnih stopenj bodisi povprečnih 
davčnih stopenj je jasno, da je bil ta davek vedno progresiven. Ni pa jasno, 
kdaj je bil »najbolj progresiven«. Poleg tega je videti, da različne mere stopnje 
progresivnosti omogočajo nasprotujoča si razumevanja. Pričujoča študija 
prispeva k tej stalni razpravi z utemeljevanjem, da je o dveh dobro uveljavljenih 
in široko uporabljanih indeksih progresivnosti bolje razmišljati kot o merilih 
redistributivnosti.
Numerične vrednosti šestih različnih indeksov progresivnosti so bile za 
ameriški zvezni davek na dohodek določene od leta 1929 do leta 2010. Teh 
šest indeksov se uvršča v dva različna razreda. Dva indeksa, ki so ju definirali 
Musgrave in Thin (1948) ter Reynolds in Smolensky (1977), sta izračunana 
z Lorenzovo krivuljo, standardno »krivuljo koncentracije dohodka« pred 
obdavčitvijo in po njej. Štirje indeksi, ki so jih definirali Kakwani (1977), Suits 
(1977), Stroup (2005) in Mathews (2016), pa so izračunani na osnovi krivulje 
koncentracije dohodka pred obdavčitvijo in krivulje koncentracije davka.
Progresivni davek: (i) nalaga posameznikom z visokimi dohodki nesorazmerno 
davčno breme, tako da (ii) postane končna distribucija dohodka bolj 
enakovredna. Vseh teh šest indeksov meri učinek davka glede na ta dva 
tesno povezana izida. Širši namen pričujoče študije je jasno prikazati, kako 
različni indeksi progresivnosti merijo različne značilosti davka. Z računanjem 
indeksnih vrednosti ameriškega zveznega davka na dohodek od leta 1929 
do leta 2010 (v tem obdobju je prišlo do velikih sprememb tako pri deležu 
prebivalstva, zavezanega za plačilo tega davka, kot pri deležu davka glede na 
znesek dohodkov vseh državljanov) lahko ugotovimo, kaj se dejansko meri z 
vsakim indeksom. Na osnovi izračunanih vrednosti lahko potrdimo, da indeksi 
Kakwanija, Suitsa, Stroupa in Mathewsa merijo progresivnost, medtem ko 
indeksa Musgravea/Thina in Reynoldsa/Smolenskyja merita redistributivnost. 
Kateri indeks je najbolj uporaben, je odvisno od tega, na katera vprašanja 
želimo odgovoriti (tj. katere vidike politike si prizadevamo oceniti). Kdor 
želi oceniti, kako je breme financiranja vladnih izdatkov porazdeljeno med 
različnimi segmenti prebivalstva, mora npr. pogledati vrednosti mer Kakwanija, 
Suitsa, Stroupa in Mathewsa. Kdor pa želi potrdilo, da davčna politika zmanjša 
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neenakost dohodkov, mora za oceno, ali je ta cilj dosežen, pogledati meri 
Musgravea/Thina in Reynoldsa/Smolenskyja.
Izračunane indeksne vrednosti razkrivajo, da je v zgodnjih 1940. letih prišlo 
do dramatične in nenadne spremembe pri progresivnosti in redistributivnosti 
ameriškega zveznega davka na dohodek. Kot so pokazale meritve Kakwanija, 
Suitsa, Stroupa in Mathewsa, je bil ta davek prej veliko bolj progresiven. 
Meritve Musgravea/Thina in Reynoldsa/Smolenskyja pa so pokazale, da je 
bila njegova redistributivnost prej veliko manjša. Na prvi pogled so ti rezultati 
protislovnii, vendar to protislovje izgine ob skrbni proučitvi temeljne razlike 
med tem, kaj vsak razred indeksov resnično meri.
Davek je pomembno redistributiven, kadar sta izpolnjena dva pogoja: (a) 
en segment prebivalstva mora nositi nesorazmerno veliko davčno breme in 
(b) davek sam po sebi mora biti precej visok. Na indekse Kakwanija, Suitsa, 
Stroupa in Mathewsa – ki se osredotočajo na progresivnost obdavčitve – vpliva 
samo pogoj (a), ne pa tudi (b). Toda indeksa Musgravea/Thina in Reynoldsa/
Smolenskyja sta odvisna od velikosti davčnega sistema. Ameriški zvezni davek 
na dohodek lahko pomembno redistribuira dohodek, ker se je v zgodnjih 1940. 
letih višina davka (merjena z odstotkom dohodkov vseh državljanov, plačanim 
v davčno blagajno) dramatično povečala. Ker je bil davek vedno progresiven, 
je njegovo drastično zvišanje v tem času vodilo do dramatičnega povečanja 
vrednosti indeksov Musgravea/Thina in Reynoldsa/Smolenskyja. Hkrati se 
je v istem času povečal tudi obseg davka (merjen z deležem prebivalstva, 
zavezanega za njegovo plačilo). To je bolj enakovredno razporedilo davčno 
breme med celotnim prebivalstvom, kar je vodilo do zmanjšanja vrednosti 
indeksov Kakwanija, Suitsa, Stroupa in Mathewsa. Razločevanje med vzroki teh 
dveh različnih izidov ponazarja različne atribute davka, merjenega z enim ali 
drugim razredom indeksov, kar razkriva, da indeksi Kakwanija, Suitsa, Stroupa 
in Mathewsa v resnici merijo progresivnost, medtem ko indeksa Musgravea/
Thina in Reynoldsa/Smolenskyja merita redistributivnost.
Razen tega je bil od sredine 1970. let do leta 2010 ameriški zvezni davek na 
dohodek (i) bolj progresiven kot v obdobju od zgodnjih 1950. let do sredine 
1970. let in je (ii) v večji meri redistribuiral dohodek kot v času od zgodnjih 
1950. let do sredine 1970. let. Ob koncu članka avtor navaja nekatere 
preliminarne ugotovitve glede izidov progresivnosti in redistributivnosti 
odvisno od političnega vodstva. V povprečju je bil ameriški zvezni davek na 
dohodek bolj progresiven v letih, ko je bil na oblasti demokratski predsednik, 
medtem ko je bil dohodek v večji meri redistribuiran v letih, ko je bil na oblasti 
republikanski predsednik. Vse omenjene ugotovitve pa je mogoče oceniti 
samo ob pravilnem razumevanju, kaj meri posamezni razred indeksov.
